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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF
APPELLATE AND DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I. NEW MEXICO V. MESCALERO APACIE TRIBE-AFFIRMED
In New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe,' the Supreme Court unani-
mously affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision 2 that the application of New
Mexico's game licensing laws to on-reservation hunting and fishing by non-
members3 of the Mescalero Apache tribe (Tribe) was preempted by the op-
eration of federal law.
4
The Supreme Court's holding was based on evidence that the governing
body of the Tribe, working closely with the federal government under the
authority of federal law, had exercised its lawful authority to develop and
manage the reservation's fish and game resources for the benefit of Tribal
members.5 In light of the Tribe's unquestioned authority to regulate the use
of its own resources by members and non-members, 6 the state did not have
exclusive jurisdiction over licensing game activities on Tribal lands. 7 Weigh-
ing the federal interest reflected in the comprehensive tribal game manage-
ment program established pursuant to federal law8 against the state's
attenuated interests in licensing game activities on Tribal lands, concurrent
jurisdiction was precluded. 9 Hence, the state laws were preempted. 10 Al-
though the precise issues presented in this decision seem relatively unimpor-
tant, the Court's decision clearly reflects its commitment to determine the
difficult issues raised in claims of concurrent jurisdiction by carefully balanc-
ing the interests of each of the concerned parties.
A. Background
With the aid of extensive federal assistance and supervision, the Tribe
has established a comprehensive scheme for managing reservation fish and
1. 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
2. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982), a d, 103 S. Ct.
2378 (1983). The Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's original opinion in this litigation
for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). See New Mexico
v. Mescalero Apache Indian Tribe, 450 U.S. 1036 (198 1),vacattg 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. Both the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court occasionally interchange the terms
"non-members" and "non-Indians". The important distinction, however, is between Tribal
members and non-members, including non-Mescalero Indians. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724, 726 n.l (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 2381, 2391.
5. See id at 2386-91.
6. Id at 2387-88.
7. Id at 2388.
8. See id at 2387-89.
9. Id at 2391.
10. Id
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wildlife resources. " Tribal ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary
of the Interior, carefully regulate the conditions under which both tribal
members and non-members may fish and hunt so as to attend to the neces-
sary conservation needs of reservation wildlife.' 2 Frequently, New Mexico's
fishing and gaming regulations have conflicted with the tribal regulations. 13
New Mexico, through its Department of Game and Fish, sought to enforce
its regulations by arresting hunters 14 possessing game killed on the reserva-
tion in violation of state hunting regulations.1 5
In 1977,16 the Tribe, seeking to prevent state regulation of on-reserva-
tion hunting and fishing, filed suit against New Mexico in the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, asking for declaratory and
injunctive relief.17 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's order enjoining the state from applying its
game laws to Tribal lands.' 8 Following New Mexico's petition for a writ of
certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the Tenth Circuit's judgment' 9 and
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Montana v. United States.
20
On remand, the Tenth Circuit once again held that New Mexico did not
have jurisdiction to regulate hunting and fishing on the tribal lands.2 ' The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari and affirmed the Tenth Circuit.
22
B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision on Remand
On remand, the Tenth Circuit found that Montana v. United States 23 was
inapposite. Montana addressed the question of an Indian tribe's power to
11. Id. at 2382. For example, development of the reservation's fishing and wildlife re-
sources has taken place through stocking fishing ponds, establishing a federal fish hatchery on
the reservation, and managing and developing a herd of elk donated by the National Park
Service. Id The Tribe has also constructed a large resort complex financed principally with
federal funds. Id. at 2382 n.3.
12. The Tribal Council, after consultation with professional conservationists, annually
adopts hunting and fishing ordinances pursuant to the Tribal constitution. These ordinances
have always been approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Id. at 2383.
13. For example, the Tribe permits both a buck and a doe to be killed; the state permits
only a buck to be killed. The Tribe, unlike the state, permits the purchase of an elk license in
two consecutive years. Additionally, Tribal seasons for both hunting and fishing do not always
coincide with state imposed seasons. Finally, Tribal ordinances have specified that state hunt-
ing and fishing licenses are not required by members or non-members who hunt and fish on the
reservation. Id
14. It is unclear whether only non-Indians (as opposed to non-members) were arrested. See
supra note 3.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 2383.
16. Prior to 1977, the Tribe had consented to the state's application of its hunting and
fishing regulations to the reservation. Id. at 2383 n. 10. As the Tribe sought to create an exten-
sive tourism program to attract income and create employment on the reservation, it became
clear that the state's regulations could adversely affect that plan. Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 776 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
17. 103 S. Ct. at 2383.
18. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 630 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), vacated, 450
U.S. 1036 (1981).
19. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 450 U.S. 1036 (1981).
20. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
21. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, 677 F.2d 55 (10th Cir. 1982),af'd, 103 S. Ct.
2378 (1983).
22. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 103 S. Ct. 2378 (1983).
23. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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regulate hunting and fishing on reservation land which had been trans-
ferred, in fee, to non-members of the tribe. 24 The Court held that neither
treaty nor statute had granted the tribe such powers, 25 and that the non-
members' hunting and fishing activities were not of a type justifying the ex-
ercise of the tribe's inherent sovereign power.26 Hence, the tribe did not
have authority to regulate game activities on alienated land even though
that land was within reservation boundaries.2 7 The Tenth Circuit found
Mescalero readily distinguishable from Montana because over ninety-nine per-
cent of the lands subject to tribal regulation in Mescalero were owned by the
Tribe.
2 8
After rejecting the application of Montana, the Tenth Circuit noted that
subsequent to Montana the Court had decided Merrion o. Jcarilla Apache
Tribe.29 Merrion, in holding that the Jicarilla Apache Tribe had the power to
tax non-Indians doing business on the reservation, recognized that a tribe's
sovereign authority included the power to control economic activity on tri-
bal lands. 30 Because the Tribe's fishing and hunting ordinances related to
economic activities conducted on Tribal lands, the Tenth Circuit held that
Merrion, and not Montana, was the controlling precedent.3 1 In light of the
state's demonstrated lack of interest in the Tribe's economic development,
and the interference with that development which would have resulted from
permitting state regulation, the Tenth Circuit held that there was no basis
for concluding that New Mexico had the power to interfere with the Tribe's
power to regulate economic activity conducted on Tribal lands. 32 The
Tenth Circuit therefore reaffirmed the district court's grant of injunctive and
declaratory relief.
C. The Supreme Court's Opinzion
The Supreme Court, having earlier remanded the case for reconsidera-
tion in light of Montana v. United States, agreed with the Tenth Circuit that
Montana was not controlling. Unlike Mescalero, Montana concerned land
within the tribal reservation owned in fee simple by non-Indians. 33 The
Court in Montana held only that the Crow Tribe could not prohibit hunting
and fishing by non-members on reservation land no longer owned by the
24. Id at 557.
25. Id at 557-63.
26. Id at 563-65.
27. See id at 557, 567.
28. 677 F.2d at 57 & n.l.
29. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
30. See id. at 141-44.
31. 677 F.2d at 57.
32. Id. The court stated:
Dual regulation of the use of these resources would interfere with the Tribe's
efforts to manage, preserve, and improve wildlife resources on its reservation. The
state, therefore, cannot interfere by attempting to control non-Indian hunting and
fishing conducted exclusively on reservation land held by the Tribe any more than it
could do so if the activities in question took place in one of New Mexico's neighboring
states.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 2384.
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tribe. 34 Thus, Montana had not considered whether a state could exercise
concurrent jurisdiction over the hunting and fishing activities of non-mem-
bers on Indian-owned reservation land.
35
The Court then acknowledged that it has long ago departed from the
exclusive tribal sovereignty concept reflected in its early Worcester v. Georgia
36
decision. In Worcester, the Court had recognized Indian tribes as sovereign
nations-independent governments, within whose boundaries state laws
"can have no force."'3 7 The Court's review of decisions following Worcester
revealed that those decisions had clearly limited the scope of tribal sover-
eignty,38 and had recognized a state's authority to exercise concurrent juris-
diction over the on-reservation activities of non-members unless state
jurisdiction was preempted by federal law39 or conflicted with a tribe's in-
herent sovereign power.40  In White Mounlain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 41 the
Court emphasized that the presence of federal preemption does not depend
"on mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or Tribal sovereignty."'4 2
Rather, the presence of federal preemption is determined by a "partcu/arzed
inquizy into the nature of the state, federal, and Tribal interests at stake."
'43
Inquiring into the federal and Tribal interests first, the Court's preemp-
tion inquiry focused on the strong federal policy of encouraging Tribal self-
sufficiency and self-government; 44 federal laws embodying Congress' intent
that the Secretary of the Interior and the Tribal Council manage reservation
resources; 45 and the Tribal interest in self-government as reflected by its con-
34. Se 450 U.S. at 557-67. Accord 103 S. Ct. at 2384.
35. 103 S. Ct. at 2384.
36. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
37. Id at 561.
38. A tribe's power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members remains unquestioned. 103
S. Ct. at 2385. Absent governing congressional acts, a state's actions may not infringe on those
rights. Id Tribes have been implicitly divested of their exclusive sovereignty because of their
dependent status, however. Id; see, e.g., Oliphant v. Susquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978) (Indians have no criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed by non-members within
the reservation's boundaries); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-68
(1974) (possessory right of Indian tribes to their aboriginal lands is a matter of federal law,
extinguishable only with federal consent). Under certain circumstances, states may validly ex-
ercise jurisdiction over on-reservation activities of non-members. See, e.g., Washington v. Con-
federated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (imposition and
enforcement of state's cigarette excise tax to non-Indians on a reservation is valid); Moe v. Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (state may require Indian proprietor of on-reservation
"smoke-shops" to add cigarette sales or excise tax to articles sold to non-Indians). Furthermore,
under exceptional circumstances, states may even exercise jurisdiction over the on-reservation
activities of tribal members. See, e.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 433 U.S. 165,
175 (1977) (state may regulate the on-reservation activities of tribal members who exercise their
right to take steelheads (fish) from the waters passing through the reservation when that right
must be exercised "in common with all citizens of the Territory").
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2385. Accord Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S.
832 (1982).
40. 103 S. Ct. at 2386 n.16.
41. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
42. Id at 145.
43. Id. (emphasis supplied).
44. See 103 S. Ct. at 2387. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982) (vesting power to manage
reservation's resources in tribal council selected pursuant to tribal constitution).
45. See 103 S. Ct. at 2388 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b)(1982) (criminalizing entry on Indian
lands for purpose of hunting, fishing, or trapping without tribal consent); 25 U.S.C.
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stitution, ordinances, and particularly by its clearly established intention
and ability to manage, preserve, and improve reservation wildlife for pur-
poses of economic self-sufficiency. 46 The Court noted that concurrent juris-
diction would effectively nullify the Tribe's jurisdiction to regulate its own
reservation wildlife, because such dual jurisdiction would effectively permit
the state to override the Tribe's power to dictate the terms on which non-
members could utilize reservation resources. 47  Concurrent jurisdiction
would also interfere with the comprehensive scheme of federal and tribal
management established pursuant to federal law, allowing the state to sup-
plant the scheme with an inconsistent dual system which could severely im-
pede the ability of the Tribe to conduct a sound management program. 48
Finally, the Court noted that concurrent jurisdiction would threaten Con-
gress' overriding objective of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and self-gov-
ernment, by allowing enforcement of regulations which would "seriously
'undermine the [government's and the Tribe's] ability to make the wide
range of determinations committed [by Congress] to [their] authority.' 49
Evaluating the weight of the state interest, the court emphasized that
New Mexico had neither contributed any significant funds or services to the
maintenance, preservation, or improvement of reservation resources, nor was
able to point to any off-reservation effects that would warrant state interven-
tion.50 New Mexico therefore had no interest sufficiently weighty to justify
the deleterious effects created by recognizing concurrent jurisdiction.5 1 Ac-
cordingly, the Court's "particularized inquiry" into the nature of the as-
serted federal, state, and Tribal interests led to its determination that the
State's exercise of jurisdiction over the on-reservation hunting and fishing
activities of non-members was preempted by the operation of federal law.
52
D. Consequences
It seems clear that the Supreme Court granted certiorari following its
remand in reliance on Montana v. UnitedStates to attempt to clarify the troub-
lesome issues arising from conflicting exercises of state and tribal authority
over resources located on Indian lands. Indeed, Mescalero gives every indica-
tion of the Court's interest in shoring-up, to some meaningful extent, the
eroding concept of tribal sovereignty while at the same time assuring all af-
fected parties (federal, state, and Indian) of fair and equitable consideration.
§ 1321(b)(1982) (preempting state authority to regulate Indian hunting, trapping, or fishing
rights granted by federal treaty or statute)); ste also 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1982).
46. See 103 S. Ct. at 2382-83.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 2388. For example, the Tribal ordinance permitting the killing of both a
buck and a doe is based on the recommendations of a Bureau of Indian Affairs range conserva-
tionist and is intended to curb effectively the excessive growth of the on-reservation deer popula-
tion. The state regulations do not reflect this objective, and because killing a doe would violate
state law, Tribal authority would be effectively abrogated. Id. at 2389.
48. Id See also supra note 47.
49. 103 S. Ct. at 2389 (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136,
149 (1980)).
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2390-91.




It remains to be seen, however, if the Court's "particularized inquiry" ap-
proach will accomplish this task.
It is, indeed, a reality that certain resources are becoming scarce. When
some of those resources are located on or run through Indian lands (e.g.,
wildlife, minerals, or water), bordering states are likely to assert or attempt
to assert some degree of jurisdiction over the use or dispensation of those
resources. Affected Indian tribes, very much wary of state encroachment on
their tribal jurisdiction, are just as likely to resist through litigation. Simi-
larly, the federal government, responsible for establishing and protecting the
scope of tribal jurisdiction, has an interest in conflicts between state and
tribal authority. Fair determination of such tripartite interests will surely
challenge the Court's ingenuity.
Because the analysis of federal preemption recognizes the strong federal
policy toward tribal self-government, the Court's "particularized inquiry"
analysis, at least superficially, reduces the probability of an unbalanced
weighing of tribal interests. The concern, however, is for those situations
when a case arises where, unlike Mescalero, the asserted interests are not so
clearly de minimis in relation to each other. For instance, it will be interest-
ing to follow the Court's application of its particularized "inquiry" to cases
where states are able to show a substantial interest. It remains to be seen
how weighty an asserted state interest must be in order to tip the scales in
favor of concurrent jurisdiction.
Susan N. Harris Dixon
II. WAT V. WESTERN NUCLEAR CORP. -REVERSED
Under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act' (SRHA), over thirty million
acres of public land were transferred to private ownership. 2 Although the
lands were transferred in fee, 3 the title acquired was limited by a reservation
to the United States of "all the coal and other minerals in the lands so en-
tered and patented, together with the right to prospect for, mine, and re-
move the same." 4 The question presented to the Supreme Court in Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc. 5 was whether the Tenth Circuit had properly excluded
gravel from the ambit of the SRHA's mineral reservation. 6 In a five-four
decision, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and held that gravel was a
reserved mineral under the SRHA.
7
The question of gravel's reserved mineral status arose following fifty
years of administrative practice in which gravel was not treated as a mineral
reserved pursuant to the SRHA.8 Notwithstanding that prior practice, an
1. 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1976).
2. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 & n.4 (1983).
3. See 43 U.S.C. § 293 (1976).
4. 43 U.S.C. § 299 (1976).
5. 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
6. Id. at 2222-23. See Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234 (198 1), re'd sub noma.
Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 2232.
8. See id. at 2238 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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administrative trespass action was brought against Western Nuclear, Inc.,
alleging that Western Nuclear's removal of gravel from land originally pat-
ented under the SRHA impinged on the government's mineral rights.9 The
administrative tribunals ruled that gravel was a mineral reserved under
SRHA, and that Western Nuclear's removal of this mineral without the
United States' consent constituted an involuntary trespass. 10
Hearing an appeal from the administrative order, the district court
noted that although the SRHA mineral exemption was to be construed ac-
cording to Congress' intent at the time of enactmentI there was no clear
evidence of Congress' intent to include or exclude gravel. 1 2 There was, how-
ever, clear evidence that by including the mineral reservation Congress had
intended to sever the mineral estate from the surface estate. 13 The purpose
of this severance, according to the district court, was to provide settlers with
free land while simultaneously ensuring that undiscovered valuable sub-
stances remained the property of the government.' 4 Thus, it was irrelevant
whether a particular substance was considered a mineral at the time of
SRHA's enactment. Congress' intent was not to tie the severed estate to a
particular set of defined substances, but was to reserve ownership of all sub-
surface substances which experience proved were "of commercial value."'
15
Hence, because gravel had become a valuable subsurface substance, it fell
within the SRHA mineral reservation.
16
The Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's flexible definition of the
term "mineral" in the SRHA reservation, and instead examined whether
Congress had specifically intended to include gravel in the reserved mineral
estate.' 7 The court noted that at the time SRHA was enacted, the Interior
Department's interpretation of the term "mineral" excluded gravel. 18 Simi-
larly, gravel was not an energy source of the kind Congress clearly intended
9. Id. at 2221.
10. Western Nuclear, Inc., 85 Interior Dec. 129 (1978), aj'd, 475 F. Supp. 654 (D. Wyo.
1979), rev'd, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
11. Western Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 475 F. Supp. 654, 656 (D. Wyo. 1979), rev'd, 664
F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'dsub noma. Watt v. Western Nuclear Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
12. See 475 F. Supp. at 662 (concluding, after examination of authorities, that the term
"mineral" did not have a "closed, precise meaning" at time of SRHA's enactment).
13. Id at 658.
14. Id at 662-63. The district court observed that the entire concept of a patent reserving
mineral rights to the government was a response to the fraudulent claims and unintended trans-
fers which had become rampant under the prior system of categorically classifying land as min-
eral or nonmineral, and then transferring all the rights to the land, regardless of the land's
actual mineral content. See id at 657. See generally P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW
DEVELOPMENT 503-19 (1968).
15. 475 F. Supp. at 662-63. The district court relied on United States v. Union Oil Co.,
549 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 930 (1977), which held that geothermal resources
fell within SRHA's mineral reservation because Congress had not intended to transfer any sub-
surface energy resources to SRHA homesteaders. Id at 1274, quoted in Western Nuclear, 475 F.
Supp. at 662.
16. 475 F. Supp. at 663.
17. Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Andrus, 664 F.2d 234, 239 (10th Cir. 1981),rev'd sub noa. Watt
v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983).
18. See Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910), overruled, Layman v. Ellis,
52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929). The SRHA was enacted in 1916. Stock Raising Homestead
Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 862, ch. 9 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1976)).
1984]
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to reserve,19 nor was it a substance normally associated with prospecting and
mining.20 Further, to include gravel within the SRHA reservation would,
given the nature of most of the terrain subject to the SRHA, effectively nul-
lify SRHA's grant of land ownership: "[i]f such common substances [as
gravel] were considered to be included within the mineral reservation, then
under all the many patents issued pursuant to the Stock-Raising Homestead
Act, the patentees would own only the dirt, and little or nothing more."' 2 1
The Tenth Circuit concluded that, in light of all the above factors, gravel
was not a reserved mineral under the SRHA.
22
In reversing the Tenth Circuit, a majority of the Court concluded,
under a flexible analysis similar to that used by the district court, that gravel
fell within the SRHA's mineral reservation. 23 The majority found that there
was no prevailing legal understanding of the term "mineral" at the time of
SRHA's enactment.2 4 Although the Interior Department's construction of
the term "mineral" when classifying lands as mineral or non-mineral had
indeed excluded gravel, 25 a contemporaneous Supreme Court construction
of the term "mineral" had approved a definition which included gravel as a
mineral. 26 Hence, there was no basis for assuming that Congress had neces-
sarily adopted the Interior Department's construction of the term
"mineral." 27
Having rejected a solution based on the importation of meaning
through contemporaneous constructions of similar Acts, the Court investi-
gated the degree to which the purposes underlying the SRHA would illumi-
nate gravel's status as a reserved mineral. 28 Reviewing the genesis of the
reserved-right patent, the Court concluded that Congress had been attempt-
ing to prevent abuse of the homestead land grant program and ensure that
the homestead program did not prevent mineral exploitation of homestead
lands. 29 Thus, Congress' purpose in severing the mineral estate was to assure
the "concurrent development of both the surface and subsurface of SRHA
lands."
30
Next, echoing the district court, the Supreme Court examined the ap-
propriate characterization of gravel in light of Congress' functional purpose
in severing the mineral estate from the surface estate.3 t The Court found
19. 664 F.2d at 241 (distinguishing United States v. Union Oil Co., 547 F.2d 1271 (9th
Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 930 (1977)).
20. 664 F.2d at 242 (quoting State Land Bd. v. State Dep't of Fish & Game, 408 P.2d 707,
708 (Utah 1965)).
21. See 664 F.2d at 242.
22. Id
23. Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2218 (1983), rev'g Western Nuclear Corp. v.
Andrus, 664 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1981).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2223.
25. Id at 2224 (citing Zimmerman v. Brunson, 39 Pub. Lands Dec. 310 (1910), overmled,
Layman v. Ellis, 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 714 (1929)).
26. 103 S. Ct. at 2224 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 536
(1903)).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 2224.
28. Id at 2225.
29. See id at 2225-26.
30. Id at 2226.
31. Ste id at 2227. The Court stated that "[slince Congress intended to facilitate develop-
[Vol. 61:2
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that because Congress' primary intention in enacting the SRHA was to per-
mit families to support themselves through farming and ranching, 32 Con-
gress had not contemplated that homsteaders would exploit the subsurface
estate for commercial purposes. 33 In reserving the mineral estate Congress
had therefore reserved ownership of all inorganic subsurface substances
which were commercially exploitable and which were not necessary to effect
the ranching and farming surface uses contemplated by the SRHA.34 Be-
cause gravel was part of the reserved mineral estate under the Court's func-
tional definition, the Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and affirmed the
district court. 35 To buttress its conclusion, the Court noted that gravel had
traditionally been characterized as a mineral under federal mining laws,
36
and that case law had established a principle of construction disfavoring
conveyances of rights not explicitly set forth in a government patent.
37
The dissent, like the Tenth Circuit, focused on the fact that at the time
of SRHA's enactment the Interior Department had concluded, after many
years of experience with materials of a quasi-mineral character, that gravel
was not a mineral for purposes of classifying public lands.38 Given the Inte-
rior Department's important role in drafting the SRHA and testifying in its
favor, 39 it was reasonable to conclude that Congress had not included gravel
within the SRHA's mineral reservation. 40  Reference to other statutes also
supported the conclusion that Congress did not generally include gravel
when using the term "mineral."' Finally, Congress had not enacted SRHA
solely for economic reasons; there was an overriding civic interest in making
persons independent landowners. 42 In light of this intent, Congress surely
did not intend to "destroy that sovereignty by reserving the commonplace
substances that actually constitute much of [the granted land]."'4 3 Thus, the




ment of both surface and subsurface resources, the determination of whether a particular sub-
stance is included in the surface estate or the mineral estate should be made in light of the use of
the surface estate that Congress contemplated." Id.
32. See id. at 2228.
33. Id at 2228-30.
34. Id. at 2228 & 2229 n.14. Under the Court's functional approach to defining the scope
of the SRHA mineral reservation, the homesteader has the right to use otherwise reserved min-
erals for homestead purposes. Id at 2229 n.15.
35. Id at 2232.
36. Id. at 2230-31.
37. Id. at 2231 (quoting United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 353 U.S, 112 (1957)).
38. &e id. at 2233-35 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39. Id at 2235 & n.9.
40. Id at 2235-36.
41. Id at 2236-37.





III. SILKWOOD V. KERR-McGEE CORP.-REVERSED
In a five-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the portion of the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Stlkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. '
which held that certain punitive damage awards were preempted by federal
regulation of nuclear plant safety. 2 The Court held that Congress, in enact-
ing and amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,3 had not intended to
preclude victims of nuclear power plant radiation incidents from pursuing
state-authorized tort remedies. 4 An award of punitive damages imposed
under state tort law, although having a regulatory effect on plant safety, was
therefore not preempted.5
A. Facts
Karen Silkwood, a worker at a Kerr-McGee nuclear fuel plant in
Oklahoma, had been contaminated by plutonium during a three-day period
in November, 1974.6 Shortly thereafter, she was killed in an unrelated auto-
mobile accident. 7 Silkwood's estate brought common law tort actions in fed-
eral district court against Kerr-McGee to recover for the personal injuries
and property damages caused by the contamination. 8
B. Lower Court Treatment of Silkwood
The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict awarding the es-
tate $505,000 in compensatory damages and $10,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages.9 Kerr-McGee appealed to the Tenth Circuit, alleging, inter alia,10
that recovery for Silkwood's personal injuries was confined to workers' com-
pensation limits and that imposition of punitive damages was preempted by
federal law. I '
The Tenth Circuit agreed that, in the absence of contrary evidence, a
worker's injuries should be presumed to have occurred during the course of
employment.' 2 Thus, Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act 13 provided
1. 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
2. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2284 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
4. 104 S. Ct. at 625.
5. Id at 626.
6. Id at 618.
7. Id
8. Id
9. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
10. Kerr-McGee also claimed that the verdict was excessive and contrary to the weight of
the evidence, that the trial court had erred in rulings and instructions, and that prejudicial
publicity, misconduct of opposing counsel, and errors in the court's rulings and instructions had
denied it a fair trial. Brief of Appellants at 20-30, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908
(10th Cir. 1981), reo'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
11. Id For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit Court's decision, see Comment, Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp.: Workers' Compensation and Federal Preemption Rescue the Nuclear Tortfeasor, 60
DEN. L.J. 291 (1983).
12. 667 F.2d at 917.
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 1-180 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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the sole basis to recover damages for Silkwood's personal injuries. 14 Con-
versely, compensatory damages for Silkwood's destroyed property were re-
coverable under state tort law because such recovery was not preempted by
either the state workers' compensation laws or by the federal nuclear regula-
tory scheme.
15
In assessing Kerr-McGee's argument that punitive damages were pre-
empted by federal regulation of nuclear plant safety, the court of appeals
focused on the deterrent, and therefore regulatory, effect of punitive dam-
ages.16 Relying on Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,'17 the court stated
that the usually strong presumption against preemption must yield when the
federal government extensively occupies a regulatory area, as it had done in
the area of radiation hazards created by nuclear development.i 8 Writing for
the majority, Judge Logan reasoned that a judicial award of punitive dam-
ages was as intrusive upon the federal regulatory scheme as a direct legisla-
tive act of the state.' 9 The regulatory effect of punitive damage awards
therefore conflicted with federal control over nuclear safety.20 Further, the
power to punish nuclear plant operators for violation of nuclear safety stan-
dards was vested in a federal agency, 2' indicating the superfluousness of pu-
nitive damages in the context of existing federal regulations.2 2 These factors
led the court to conclude that punitive damage awards were preempted for
tort claims involving radiation hazards associated with nuclear power
plants.
23
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Doyle contended that preventing imposi-
tion of punitive damages in a case such as Silkwood "carries the preemption
concept far beyond anything that could have been intended or could ever be
implied [by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954]."24 The proper test, Judge
Doyle wrote, is whether an award of punitive damages impedes the accom-
plishment of congressional purposes and objectives.2 5 Under this test, pre-
emption did not apply to Silkwood.26 Judge Doyle characterized tort actions
as "a far cry" from the explicit statutory regulation found preempted in
Northern States.27 Tort claims, including punitive damage claims, did not
collide with the federal regulatory scheme, and therefore were not
preempted.
28
14. 667 F.2d at 919.
15. Id. at 920.
16. Id at 922.
17. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affdmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
18. The nuclear industry was initially developed by the federal government, and is closely
linked with national security; the overall industry, especially in the area of radiation hazards, is
extensively regulated by the federal government. Silkwood, 667 F.2d at 923.
19. Id at 923.
20. Id. at 922-23.
21. Id. at 923.
22. Id
23. See id.
24. Id. at 929 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
25. Id at 930 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)).
26. 667 F.2d at 930 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
27. Id at 929.
28. Id Judge Doyle emphasized that Congress' purpose was to preempt state licenstig au-
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C. Silkwood in the Supreme Court
1. The Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court apparently agreed with Judge Doyle's analysis.
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that the test for preemption in
radiation injury cases is not, as the Tenth Circuit held, whether the federal
government has occupied the field.29 Rather, the test is whether the state
law in question conflicts with or frustrates the objectives of federal law.
30
The Court explained that its holding in Pacifw Gas and Electri'c Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission,3 t decided only nine
months earlier, was inapplicable to Sdlkwood. 32 In Paczfc Gas, the Court held
that the federal government had occupied the entire field of nuclear safety
regulation, and that states were therefore prohibited from regulating the
safety aspects of nuclear development. 33 According to Justice White, the
preempted field did not include traditional state tort law remedies. 34 This
conclusion was based on an analysis of legislative history relating to the
Atomic Energy Act. Conceding that the regulatory effect of state tort law
arguably justified a finding of preemption under Pacif# Gas,35 the majority
held that Congress had nonetheless intended that state remedies be left
intact.
36
First, there was no legislative evidence that Congress, in deciding to li-
cense private nuclear plants, had intended to prevent recovery for injuries
caused by plant operations. 3 7 Congress' failure to provide any federal reme-
dies for nuclear incident injuries was further evidence that state tort reme-
dies were not preempted; the Court refused to find a congressional intent to
"remove all means of judicial recourse for victims of illegal conduct." 38 Fi-
nally, the only congressional discussion about the relationship between the
federal law and state tort law remedies indicated that Congress believed that
state remedies would be available.
39
Although conceding that an award of damages based on state law was
regulatory in the sense that a nuclear facility could be threatened with liabil-
thority, not to preempt general state laws which merely affected nuclear plants. See id. at 929-
30.
29. 104 S. Ct. at 626.
30. d.
31. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
32. See 104 S. Ct. at 622-26.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 1726.
34. See 104 S. Ct. at 625.
35. Id
36. Id.
37. The Court found that "there is no indication that Congress even seriously considered
precluding the use of such remedies ...." Id. at 625.
38. Id (citing United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64
(1954)).
39. 104 S. Ct. at 623-26. The legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act did not contain
any discussion of the interaction between federal licensing and state tort law. Legislative history
from the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976), which limits the direct liability of nu-
clear plant operators in the event of catastrophic nuclear occurrences, revealed that Congress
believed that state tort law remedies survived the enactment of the Atomic Energy Act. See 104
S. Ct. at 623-26.
[Vol. 61:2
1984] U S SUPREME COURT REVIEW 419
ity for failing to conform to state standards, the Court found that this "regu-
latory consequence was something Congress was quite willing to accept."
40
The Court therefore remanded the case to the Tenth Circuit, adding that
Kerr-McGee could reassert any claim not addressed by the Tenth Circuit,
4 1
including its claim that the punitive damage award was excessive and un-
supported by the evidence.
4 2
2. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented, saying that the
decision "tortures [the Court's] earlier decisions" and "wreaks havoc with
the regulatory structure that Congress carefully created." '43 According to
Justice Blackmun, Pacific Gas mandated the Court to find that state laws
intended to regulate nuclear power safety were preempted. 44  Because
Oklahoma's state-authorized punitive damages award was intended to deter
a nuclear facility from operating in a particular manner, such an award was
regulatory, and was preempted. 4 5 Compensatory damages, which were not
intended to achieve a regulatory goal, would therefore be allowable under
Pacif Gas.46
3. Justice Powell's Dissent
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
dissented, saying that the majority's the decision was inconsistent with fed-
eral law, legislative history, and the Court's decision in Pacific Gas.4 7 This
dissent agreed with the Tenth Circuit's conclusion that the regulatory effect
of a punitive damage award would impermissibly interfere with federal reg-
ulation. 48 After Si/kwood, nuclear operators would no longer be able to rely
on the agency expertise embodied in federal safety standards. 49 Similarly,
the public would be denied the benefits of a unitary program of safety regu-
lation.50 Szikwood, according to Justice Powell, opened the door for ad hoc
jury regulation of the nuclear industry, which would clearly interfere with
the congressional purpose of creating an exclusive federal prerogative to reg-
ulate the radiation hazards associated with nuclear plants.5 ' Further, per-
mitting ad hoc jury regulation was unfair to operators complying with
stringent federal standards52 and could discourage investment in a vital
40. 104 S. Ct. at 626.
41. See supra note 10.
42. 104 S. Ct. at 626-27.
43. Id. at 627 (Blackmun, j., dissenting).
44. id. at 627-28.
45. Id. at 628. Justice Blackmun stated: "[T]he punitive damages award in this case deters
a nuclear facility from operating in the same manner as Kerr-McGee. Authority for a state to
do so, however, is precisely what the Court held to be pre-empted [sic] in Paific Gas." Id
46. Id at 629.
47. Id. 634-41 (Powell, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 635.
49. Id. at 640.
50. See id at 639.
51. See id. at 639-40.
52. Id at 640.
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source of energy. 53 For all these reasons, Justice Powell and his fellow dis-




I. BROWN V. THOMSON-AFFIRMED
In Brown v. Thomson, 1 the Supreme Court affirmed the determination of
a three judge district court panel 2 upholding the constitutionality of Wyo-
ming's most recent reapportionment statute.3 The statute was upheld by
virtue of a concurring opinion, with three Justices dissenting. 4 The Court's
reasoning is questionable in light of previous reapportionment decisions, and'
is at best of little precedential value because of the very narrow issue the case
decided. Instead of reviewing the constitutionality of Wyoming's reappor-
tionment plan as a whole, the Court limited its decision to the issue of
whether Wyoming's policy of preserving county boundaries justified the de-
viations from population equality 5 resulting from the provision of a state
representative to Niobrara County, which would not have been entitled to a
representative on the basis of population equality. 6 The basis for the Court's
decision to uphold the statute was that providing the additional representa-
tive effected a state policy lacking any hint of arbitrariness or discrimination
against population centers while simultaneously having only a de minimus
53. Id
54. Id at 640-41.
1. 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983). Brown v. Thomson was the third unsuccessful challenge to Wyo-
ming's apportionment of its House of Representatives in the last 20 years. The first challenge,
Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247 (D. Wyo. 1964),supplemented, 251 F. Supp. 450 (D. Wyo.
1965), afd sub noma. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383 U.S. 269 (1966), was decided shortly after Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the seminal decision in the area of state legislature apportion-
ment. Sims included two important holdings. First, the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2, required that state representatives be
elected through a system reflecting the principle of equal representation for equal numbers of
people. 377 U.S. at 577. Second, deviations from perfect equality were permissible if such
deviations resulted from "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational
state policy." Id. at 579. Schaefer upheld Wyoming's apportionment of its House of Representa-
tives because the deviations from population equality did not dilute the voting strength of popu-
lation centers, and because the deviations resulted from the legitimate state policy of seeking to
provide representation for all counties. 240 F. Supp. at 251. Cf Sims, 377 U.S. at 580 (recogniz-
ing that provision of representation for political subdivisions is a legitimate basis for deviations
from population). Thompson v. Thomson, 344 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Wyo. 1972), the second chal-
lenge, rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments on the same grounds articulated in Schae-
fer. Id at 1380.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1982) requires that a three judge district court hear federal court
challenges to state apportionment statutes.
3. WYO. STAT. § 28-2-109 (Supp. 1983). See Brown v. Thomson, 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983),
afg 536 F. Supp. 780 (D. Wyo. 1982).
4. Justices Stevens and O'Connor concurred in Justice Powell's opinion. Brown v. Thom-
son, 103 S. Ct. 2690, 2699 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined Justice Brennan's dissent. Id at 2700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. "Population equality" is a shorthand phrase describing the situation in which equal
numbers of people elect equal numbers of representatives. See 103 S. Ct. at 2693. See also supra
note 1.
6. See 103 S. Ct. at 2693-95.
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dilutive effect upon the voting strength of Wyoming's electorate. 7
A. Background
Wyoming's Constitution requires that each of the state's counties "shall
constitute a senatorial and representative district"8 and that "each county
shall have at least one senator and one representative." In addition, the
constitution requires that the representatives be apportioned among the
counties as equally as possible on the basis of population.' 0
As the district court pointed out, Wyoming is unique in that it has al-
ways had a very small population distributed through a large area. I Conse-
quently, counties have always been the major political subdivision within
the state, and in fact act as the major administrators of state government
programs.' 2 Historically, this central role of counties in Wyoming's political
structure has been manifested by requiring that each county have at least
one representative in Wyoming's House of Representatives.' 3 As noted, the
challenge in Thomson was limited to the application of this policy to Nio-
brara County. 14
Following the 1980 census, Wyoming reapportioned its state legisla-
ture. 15 The new apportionment statute' 6 provided for a maximum of 64
representatives,' 7 making the ideal apportionment one representative for
every 7,337 persons.' 8 Because Wyoming's constitution required allocation
of at least one representative to each county,' 9 including Niobrara, the
state's least populous county with only 2,924 people,20 the distribution of
7. Id at 2698.
8. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 3.
9. Id
10. Id
11. Brown v. Thomson, 536 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Wyo. 1982), af'd 103 S. Ct. 2690 (1983).
12. 536 F. Supp. at 784.
13. Id
14. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 2694.
16. WYo. STAT. § 28-2-109 (Supp. 1983). This statute provides in relevant part:
(a) The ratios for the apportionment of senators and representatives are fixed as
follows:
(ii) The ratio for the apportionment of the representatives is the smallest number
of people per representative which when divided into the population in each represen-
tative district as shown by the official results of the 1980 federal decennial census with
fractions rounded to the nearest whole number results in a house with sixty-three (63)
representatives;
(iii) If the number of representatives for any county is rounded to zero (0) under
the formula in paragraph (a)(ii) of this section, that county shall be given one (1)
representative which is in addition to the sixty-three (63) representatives provided by
paragraph (a)(ii) of this section;
(iv) If the provisions of paragraph (a)(iii) of this section are found to be unconsti-
tutional or have an unconstitutional result, then Niobrara county shall be joined to
Goshen county in a single representative district and the house of representatives shall
be apportioned as provided by paragraph (a)(ii) of this section.
Id.
17. Id § (a)(ii), -(iii).
18. 103 S. Ct. at 2694.
19. WYO. CONST. art. III, § 3.
20. 103 S. Ct. at 2694.
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representatives among the state's population became unequal. In fact, the
plan as enacted had an average deviation from the ideal number of residents
per representative of sixteen percent and a maximum deviation between the
largest and smallest number of residents per representative of eighty-nine
percent. 2 1 Those deviations were very similar to the deviations present in
two prior decisions upholding Wyoming's apportionment of its House of
Representatives.
22
Plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters and citizens from Wyoming's
seven most populous counties, alleged that providing one representative to
Niobrara County despite its small population impermissibly diluted the vot-
ing privileges and rights of plaintiffs and other citizens similarly situated.
23
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent Niobrara
County from having its own representative, and to require implementation
of the statutory provision which was explicitly designed to be effective if
provision of a representative for Niobrara County was declared
unconstitutional.
2 4
B. The District Court Decision
Because of the nature of the plaintiffs' allegations, the district court de-
cided the case on the very narrow issue of the dilutive effect of the one repre-
sentative granted to Niobrara County.2 5 The court found that the presence
of Niobrara County's representative in the state legislature had a statistically
insignificant dilutive effect on plaintiffs' voting rights. 26 In light of the de
minimus effect of providing the representative for Niobrara County, the
state's legitimate and nondiscriminatory desire to maintain the integrity of
counties as the state's operative political subdivisions was a sufficient basis
for concluding that the statute was constitutional.
27
C. The Supreme Court's Opinion
1. The Majority
Like the district court, the Supreme Court refused to review the consti-
tutionality of the statute as a whole, despite the blatant deviations from
population equality. 28 The majority reasoned that although previous appor-
tionment decisions had considered aspects of apportionment plans not di-
rectly challenged by the parties,29 there was no constitutional mandate that
the Court undertake such a sua sponte inquiry. 30 Accordingly, the court
21. Id
22. Id See supra note 1.
23. 103 S. Ct. at 2695.
24. Id See WYo. STAT. § 28-2-109(a)(iv) (Supp. 1983).
25. 536 F. Supp. at 781.
26. Id at 783.
27. Id
28. 103 S. Ct. at 2698 & n.9.
29. Id. at 2698 n.9. See Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 735 n. 27 (1964);
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
30. 103 S. Ct. at 2698 n.9 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 739 n.5 (1973)).
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restricted its inquiry to those challenges explicitly raised by the plaintiffs. 3 1
Whether or not the Court's decision to narrow the issues was justified, a
majority was obtained through the concurrences of Justices O'Connor and
Stevens, who joined the opinion on the understanding that it made no com-
ment on the reapportionment plan taken as a whole, which they doubted
could survive constitutional scrutiny.
32
The Court supported its decision to uphold the statute by relying on a
series of cases that justified deviations from population equality because of
legitimate state objectives.33 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, noted
that Reynolds v. Sims 34 held that a state must make an honest and good faith
effort to construct districts of equal population,35 but that because perfect
equality was impossible, legitimate state policies, such as preservation of
political subdivisions, could justify deviations from equality. 36 The Court
then pointed out that decisions following Sims had established that an ap-
portionment plan with a maximum deviation of greater than ten percent
created a prima facie case of discrimination, and was therefore unconstitu-
tional unless justified by the state.37 Proof that the legislative plan reason-
ably advanced a rational state policy and did not result in unconstitutional
population disparities among the districts satisfied the state's burden ofjusti-
fication. 38 Justice Powell conceded that the challenged portion of Wyo-
ming's plan exceeded the acceptable minimum deviation, 39 but he found
that the plan's provision of a representative for Niobrara County was none-
theless constitutional, in light of the state's proffered policy justification and
the minimal systemwide population disparities resulting solely from provid-
ing a representative for Niobrara County.4°
There were several factors the Court weighed in favor of the reappor-
tionment statute. First, through the years Wyoming had consistently ap-
plied its county-oriented representation policy without discrimination or
arbitrariness. 4' Second, the statute ensured that "population deviations are
no greater than necessary to preserve counties as representative districts."
'42
Finally, no evidence indicated that the legislative plan reflected a bias tend-
ing to favor "particular political interests or geographic areas."' 43 The Court
noted that Thomson could be distinguished from many prior decisions invali-
dating apportionment plans based on political subdivisions, because those
state defendants failed to prove the deviations resulted from the good faith
31. 103 S. Ct. at 2698 n.9.
32. Id. at 2700 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440,
444 (1967); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 579-80 (1964).
34. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
35. Id at 577.
36. Id at 580-81.
37. 103 S. Ct. at 2696 (citing Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967)).
38. See 103 S. Ct. at 2696 (citing Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328 (1973)).
39. 103 S. Ct. at 2696.
40. Id at 2698-99.
41. Id at 2696.
42. Id
43. Id at 2697 (quoting Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 187 (1971)).
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application of a legitimate state policy.4 4 Justice Powell buttressed his con-
clusion as to the legitimacy of Wyoming's plan by quoting language from
Sims stating that the character, as well as the degree, of deviation from strict
population equality must be considered in evaluating an apportionment
plan's constitutionality.
45
Having established the legitimacy of Wyoming's reasons for districting
by political subdivision, the Court analyzed the dilutive effect of providing a
representative for Niobrara County, and agreed with the district court's that
any dilutive effect was de minimus. 46 To support its conclusion, the Court
observed that considerable population variations would remain even if Nio-
brara County did not have its own representative: the average deviation
would be thirteen percent and the maximum deviation would be sixty-six
percent.4 7 In addition, the only difference resulting from granting plaintiffs
their requested relief would be that plaintiffs' class of voters would elect
44.44% of the legislature rather 43.75%.48 In view of the minimal effect Nio-
brara's one representative had on the statewide allocation of voting power,
and because Wyoming's county-oriented policy was applied neither discrimi-
natorily nor arbitrarily, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment
49
was not violated by providing a representative for Niobrara County.
50
2. The Dissent
In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
White, Marshall, and Blackmun, questioned the majority's decision and rea-
soning on several points. The dissent began by emphasizing that Thomson
was essentially lacking in precedential value because it was decided on such
a narrow issue. 5 1 Thomson could provide precedential value only in cases
challenging the incremental dilutive effect of similar reapportionment
plans.
52
Justice Brennan accused the majority of using two false premises in or-
der to avoid considering the plan in its entirety. 53 First, the majority had
presumed that the only aspect of unequal representation that matters is the
degree of individual vote dilution .54 This premise was clearly wrong, because
the Constitution's protections were not limited to preventing dilution of vot-
ing power; the Constitution also barred infgating voting power. 55 Thus, just
as a state could not effectively give two votes to persons named Niobrara, the
44. 103 S. Ct. at 2697 n.6 (citing Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 25 (1975); Kilgarlin v.
Hill, 386 U.S. 120, 124 (1967) (per curiam); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 445-46 (1967)).
45. 103 S. Ct. at 2697 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964)).
46. 103 S. Ct. at 2698.
47. Id.
48. Id. Under the alternative plan, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text, the seven
counties represented by plaintiffs would elect 28 of 63 representatives instead of 28 of 64. 103 S.
Ct. at 2698.
49. U.S. CONST., amend. XIV.
50. 103 S. Ct. at 2699.
51. Id at 2700 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Se id. See also supra note 16.
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state could not effectively give two votes to persons living in Niobrara
County. 56 The Constitution barred both "exalted classes" of voters. 5 7 Sec-
ond, the majority had reasoned that Niobrara County's representation could
be severed from the rest of the scheme and evaluated in terms of its incre-
mental effect on the equality of the system as a whole. 58 According to Jus-
tice Brennan, precedent did not justify the consideration of just one seat in a
legislative body as though it had no connection to other seats; in order to
adjudge the constitutionality of any one seat, the Court was required to eval-
uate a plan's total effects. 59 Moreover, adopting the majority's approach led
to the perverse result ofjustifying a discriminatory feature of a plan through
demonstrating that discrimination "otherwise inherent in a plan was not en-
hanced by the challenged feature."
6
Turning to the merits, the dissent found Wyoming's plan manifestly
unconstitutional.6 1 Determinative was the fact that, despite the rationality
of the state policy, the plan's proposed deviations from population equality
were so large as to be intolerable under the Constitution. 62 Accordingly, the
district court should have been reversed.
6 3
Linda K. Hammacher
II. EEOC v. WYOMING-REVERSED
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyomitg (EEOC v. Wyomtig)
addressed the constitutionality of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act2 (ADEA) as applied to the states. Specifically, the Court examined the
extent to which the tenth amendment's 3 affirmative limitation on Congress'




59. Id at 2704-05.
60. Id
61. Id at 2701-03.
62. Id at 2701-02. Justice Brennan pointed out that of Wyoming's 23 counties, only 9
were within as much as 10% of population proportionality, that the plan's average deviation
from ideal district size was 16%, and that the maximum deviation was 89%, all figures exceeding
previously permitted deviations. Id at 2702-03.
63. See id. at 2705.
1. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). ADEA makes it unlawful for any employer to make em-
ployment decisions on the basis of age unless age is a bona fide occupational qualification. Id.
§ 623(l)(1). In 1974, ADEA was amended to include state and local governments within its
definition of employer. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28, 88 Stat. 55, 74 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (1982)). The amendment provided that the term "employer" included "a State or
political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdi-
vision of a state .. " Id.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." Id.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have Power . .. To regu-




tidiscrimination principles to state governments. 5 The Court reversed the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, 6 and held that
because ADEA did not seriously impair a state's ability to function autono-




Bill Crump, a fifty-five year old District Game Division Supervisor for
the Wyoming Game and Fish Department, initiated this action by filing a
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
challenging his involuntary retirement. 8 The retirement was based upon the
state's interpretation of a Wyoming statute9 whereby a law enforcement of-
ficer was mandatorily retired at age fifty-five unless the officer accepted an
administrative position.l 0 Crump claimed that because the Game and Fish
Department's mandatory retirement policy was limited to game wardens,
the state had engaged in discrimination in violation of ADEA.t" The EEOC
filed suit in the district court on behalf of Crump, seeking damages as well as
injunctive and declaratory relief.
1 2
The district court dismissed the action, 13 reasoning that the tenth
amendment immunity analysis recognized in National League of Cities v.
Useg 14 and refined in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &P Reclamation Association,
Inc. 15 precluded application of ADEA to state retirement programs for law
enforcement officers.' 6  Under the National League of Cities/Hodel analysis,
states cannot be required to comply with federal laws which operate on the
states qua states, 17 which implicate matters that are beyond peradventure
attributes of state sovereignty,' 8 which will impair a state's ability "to struc-
ture integral operations in the area of traditional governmental functions,"' 9
5. 103 S. Ct. at 1057. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) was the
first decision to recognize that the tenth amendment would, in specified circumstances, act as an
affirmative limitation on Congress' power to regulate state governments pursuant to the com-
merce power. Id at 841-46.
6. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983), rev'g 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981).
7. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
8. Id. at 1059.
9. WYO. STAT. § 31-3-107 (1977). The statute, which is part of Wyoming's retirement
plan for highway patrol persons and game wardens, see id §§ 31-3-101 to -121, states in relevant
part: "An employee may continue in service on a year-to-year basis after.., age fifty-five (55),
with the approval of employer and under conditions as the employer may prescribe." Id. § 3-
107(c).
10. EEOC v. Wyoming, 514 F. Supp. 595, 597 (D. Wyo. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1054
(1983).
11. 514 F. Supp. at 596.
12. Id at 595.
13. Id at 600.
14. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
15. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
16. 514 F. Supp. at 600. See also id at 596 (state limited tenth amendment claim to pro-
gram for retirement of law enforcement personnel).
17. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 (1976). Accord Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 287 (1981).
18. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845. Accord H'odel, 452 U.S. at 288.
19. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. Accord Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
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and which do not reflect a supervening federal interest. 20 The district court
observed that ADEA clearly acted on the states qua states,21 that structuring
the employment relationships incidental to providing park and recreation
services was a traditional attribute of state sovereignty, 2 2 and that structur-
ing retirement programs for law enforcement officers was an integral state
legislative function which would be impaired by ADEA.23 The court re-
jected the idea that a supervening national interest preempted state preroga-
tive in this area, pointing out that Congress had itself imposed a mandatory
retirement age for federal law enforcement personnel. 24 This inconsistency
tipped the balance of interests in favor of Wyoming and required a finding
that ADEA could not be applied to the state insofar as it affected Wyoming's
employment relationship with its law enforcement personnel. 25 The EEOC
appealed the district court's opinion directly to the Supreme Court.
2 6
B. The Majority Opinion
The majority concluded it was "unnecessary . . .to override Congress's
express choice to extend ADEA to the states." 27 In reaching this decision,
the majority rejected the district court's conclusions concerning Wyoming's
tenth amendment immunity.
Although the federal statute involved in EEOC v. Wyoming clearly met
the first requirement of regulating the "states as states," a28 the Court ques-
tioned whether the mere fact that an employment relationship was involved
satisfied the National League of Cities requirement that ADEA effect an essen-
tial attribute of state sovereignty.2 9 The Court did not decide this issue,
however, because it found that ADEA did not "directly impair" Wyoming's
"ability to 'structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions.' "30
Recognizing that management of state parks was a traditional state
governmental function, 3' the majority's decision rested on its conclusion that
ADEA minimally affected this integral function. The statute merely re-
quired Wyoming to test its retirement requirements against a "reasonable
federal standard."'32 Under ADEA, Wyoming was not required to abandon
20. 1-odri, 452 U.S. at 288 n.29.
21. See 514 F. Supp. at 596-97.
22. Id at 600. Accord National League of Cties, 426 U.S. at 851.
23. 514 F. Supp. at 600.
24. Id
25. Id
26. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1057 (1983). See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1
9 8 2
) (any
party may appeal directly to Supreme Court from any decision of any court of the United
States holding an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional).
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1062. The Court also noted that prior to the district court's decision in
EEOC o. Wyoming federal courts had consistently held that application of ADEA to the states
was constitutional. Id at 1059 n.6.
28. Id at 1061.
29. Id at 1061 & n. il.
30. Id at 1062 (quoting National League of Citis, 426 U.S. at 852).
31. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
32. Id See 29 U.S.C. § 623() (1982), which provides in part that "it shall not be unlawful
for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization . . .to take any action otherwise
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its policy of ensuring competent game wardens; ADEA only required that
the fitness of game wardens be determined on a particularized basis.
33
Therefore, the requirements of ADEA did not unduly infringe upon Wyo-
ming's ability to effect its law enforcement policies.
34
Having evaluated ADEA's direct policymaking effects, the majority
then evaluated the degree to which ADEA would limit Wyoming's ability to
effect policies over a broad range of state decisions. 35 This inquiry was held
to be primarily legal, rather than factual, limited to evaluating the "direct
and obvious effect of federal legislation on the ability of the States to allocate
their resources." '36 Because ADEA lacked any obvious deleterious impact on
state finances or on state social policies implicated by the game warden hir-
ing system, the federal program did not indirectly impair a state's constitu-
tionally protected decision-making prerogative. 37  Therefore, the tenth
amendment did not preclude application of ADEA to state retirement pro-
grams for law enforcement personnel.
C. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens concurred in the result, but disagreed with the Court's
reasoning. 38 Justice Stevens stated that the power provided by the com-
merce clause was sufficient to support federal statutes applying to both pub-
lic and private employers. 39 It was upon this rationale, rather than the tenth
amendment immunity approach, that he concurred with the Court's hold-
ing.40 Justice Stevens characterized National League of Cities as "judicial fiat"
deserving prompt rejection.
41
D. ChiefJustice Burger's Dissent
The dissent by Chief Justice Burger 42 concluded that ADEA was un-
constitutional as applied to the states.43 The dissent applied the National
League of Cties/Hodel analysis44 and found that the statute involved satisfied
prohibited . . .where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business.
33. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
34. Id
35. Id at 1062-64. National League ofCites recognized that courts must consider a federal
statute's consequential effects on state decision-making in order to fully evaluate the degree of
impairment resulting from application of the statute to a state. In National League ofCities, the
Court specifically examined the extent to which financial consequential effects would seriously
affect a state's ability to pursue its social and economic policies. 426 U.S. at 846-52.
36. 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
37. Id at 1063-64.
38. Id. at 1065 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 1068.
40. Id.
41. Id at 1067. Justice Stevens dissented in National League ofCities, and would have held
the challenged statute to be a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power. 426 U.S. at 880-81
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. 103 S. Ct. at 1068 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor joined in Chief Justice Burger's dissent. See id Justice Powell also wrote a separate
dissent, joined only by Justice O'Connor. See id. at 1075 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1068-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1069. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
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each of the requirements necessary to invoke tenth amendment immunity. 45
Disagreeing with the majority, the dissent argued strongly that ADEA sub-
stantially impaired Wyoming's ability to structure delivery of integral state
services. 46 Chief Justice Burger observed that among the detrimental im-
pacts were increased employment costs due to mandatory employment of
older workers, limitations on a state's ability to hire those most physically
able to do the job, and decreased promotional opportunities.4 7 The dissent
also rejected the conclusion that the nature of the federal interest justified
state submission to the federal law, arguing that Wyoming was "setting stan-
dards to meet local needs," and that this interest reflected very real concerns
for public safety outweighing any interest the federal government asserted.
48
E. Justce Powell's Dissent
In his separate dissent, Justice Powell chose to address Justice Stevens'
view of the historical development of the commerce power, and hence the
extent of political power inhering therein.4 9 Justice Powell, expanding upon
the history and the purposes of the Constitution, emphasized the importance
of federalism as a constitutional principle50 and criticized Justice Stevens'
analysis, which implied that any state function could be preempted.
5 1
F. Conclusion
EEOC v. Wyoming is another example of the Supreme Court's obligation
to balance federal and state interests. 52 National League of Cities articulated
the concept of tenth amendment immunity, which provides an affirmative
limitation on national powers by requiring judicial review of their effect
upon state decision-making prerogatives. 53 In addition to states' rights con-
cerns, federal statutes interfering with state decision-making affect certain
individual rights to government services, especially in areas of public health
and protection, providing another basis for invoking National League of Ctlzes
protections. 54 Although EEOC v. Wyomig did not find ADEA to be an in-
fringement on the state prerogative protected by the tenth amendment, it is
clear that the policies underlying National League of Cties will be implicated
45. 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
46. Id. at 1070.
47. Md at 1070-71-
48. Id at 1069.
49. Id at 1075. (Powell, J., dissenting).
50. Id at 1080.
51. Id at 1081.
52. Other recent decisions involving state assertions of tenth amendment immunity in-
clude FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) and United Trans. Workers Union v. Long
Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982). The propriety of Supreme Court balancing of federal and
state prerogative remains a subject of some dispute. Compare Howard, The States and the Supreme
Court, 31 CATH. U.L. REv. 375, 434 (1982) (court has legitimate role in balancing state and
federal interests) with Choper, The Scope of National Power Vz -a- Vis the States. The Dispensability of
Judiciatl Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1600 (1977) (the national political branches should be relied
upon for protecting the states' rights).
53. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
54. See Tribe, Unraveting National League of Cities: The ew Federalism and 4flirnative Rghts
to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1102 (1977).
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in future challenges involving application of similar statutes to the states.
The strong split in the Court regarding the scope of the tenth amendment's
affirmative limitation on the exercise of congressional commerce power, and
the problems in applying the test of immunity, indicate that National League
of Ciizes will continue to breed controversy.
Janet A. Buxton
